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Reflectivity relates differently 
to pro sociality in naïve 
and strategic subjects
Francesca Pancotto1 & Simone Righi2*
Is pro sociality a natural impulse or the result of a self-controlled behavior? We investigate this issue in 
a lab in the field experiment with participants from the general adult population in Italy. We find two 
key results: first, that there is a positive relationship between pro sociality and strategic reasoning. 
Second, that reflectivity relates to lower pro sociality but only among strategic subjects, indicating 
that the intuitive view of pro sociality is valid only among strategic individuals. Non-strategic 
individuals are instead intuitively selfish. We surmise that these results emerge due to a common 
cognitive root between strategizing and pro sociality, namely empathy.
Procedures Pro sociality is defined as a voluntary behavior intended to benefit another person, group, or the 
society as a whole. It is one of the most remarkable qualities of human behavior yet still puzzling for scholars. 
Motivations proposed for pro social behavior are many: empathy, concern for the welfare of others, care for 
reputation or personal social status, the expectation of a social reward or pure  altruism1. The nature of the cogni-
tive mechanism activating pro social behavior is still subject to debate. The dual system of cognitive processing 
suggests that human choices are governed by two systems: a slow, effortful and calculated system and an intui-
tive, fast, and automatic one. Reflectivity (or cognitive reflection) has been  defined2 as the ability or disposition 
to resist reporting the response that first comes to mind. This disposition is frequently measured trough a set of 
questions whose correct answers are not those who first come to mind. Subjects who respond correctly to these 
questions are identified as using the slow, calculated (reflective) system of reasoning; those who respond incor-
rectly are instead identified as using the fast, intuitive system of reasoning. However, it is not yet clear whether 
pro social choices are generated by the calculated or the intuitive  system3, and if the key motivations differ for 
different individuals.
The traditional intuitive-selfishness hypothesis (ISH) postulates that humans are basically selfish and that they 
need to exert reflective control to act pro  socially4. Pro sociality would then be the outcome obtained through 
cognitive efforts. More recently, a number of contributions have put forward the Social Heuristics Hypothesis 
(SHH) which questioned this view, suggesting instead that humans are naturally pro social and that, in order 
to behave selfishly, they need to exert  reflectivity5–7. The SHH asserts that people apply intuitive or reflective 
prosocial heuristics following the history of cooperation experience. Pro social behaviors become convenient in 
real life when subjects can reasonably anticipate collaborative rather than selfish behaviors thanks to repeated 
interactions and the possibility to exert sanctions. SHH suggests that pro social attitude is then internalized 
becoming an heuristic response applied extensively by people engaging in social dilemmas thus also explaining 
pro sociality in one-shot anonymous decision contexts where cognitive reflection would rather predict a selfish 
 choice6. SHH further implies that intuition should favor pro sociality rather than selfishness in cultures where 
social experience and institutional framework allow people to develop the habit of pro sociality.
There is a large and growing number of experimental contributions that test these two opposite hypotheses 
using various proxies to measure intuitive versus reflective behavior and/or trying to exert such behavior through 
various experimental manipulations. Carefully reviewing the experimental approaches in the literature, it is 
possible to identify both similarities and differences in design that might justify the different outcomes and that 
help guiding further research. Indeed, while finding opposite results, both SSH and the ISH, traditionally relied 
heavily on two manipulations to assess whether pro sociality is intuitive or consequence of reflection: time pres-
sure (versus delay) and the cognitive load (or ego depletion).
Using time pressure to force subjects to rely on intuitive behavior, some authors find that it increases pro 
 sociality6,8–14. Other contributions find instead that—in line with the ISH—when the time pressure becomes 
very  intense15–17, it decreases cooperation. Exerting heavy time  pressure15, find that cooperation is a cognitively 
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intensive  process17, that egoistic decisions are faster in a modified dictator game,  and16 that if subjects are put in 
the conditions to avoid knowing that their behavior is self-serving this increases anti social behavior. The role 
of time is also studied by controlling pro social attitudes using response  time18–20, with results in support of the 
SSH. In particular, Lohse et al20 find that people which answer more slowly tend to be more pro social when 
asked to donate to a pro environmental cause. Overall, the intensity of the time pressure seems to play a crucial 
role in determining the direction of results.
Diverging results are found also for cognitive load manipulation, with some experiments finding support for 
the SHH prediction of an increase in pro sociality under heavy  load21–24, and others supporting ISH prediction 
of a negative effect of cognitive load on pro  sociality15,25. On this second group, given that cognitive load leads to 
depletion, Achtziger et al25 manipulates self-control resources and find that depleted dictators give considerably 
less than non-depleted ones. A possible reason for these different findings might be found in small differences in 
experimental designs. The cognitive tasks used  by15,25(i.e. Stroop task, the e-hunting task, and give-the-wrong-
answer task) differ from those largely adopted in the SHH literature (i.e. remembering letters and numbers and 
doing simple operations with them). This difference might influence the overall levels of cognitive depletion, 
and—if some non-monotonicity exists—the sign of the correlation with pro sociality. Indeed, the tasks used  in15,25 
are more complex than those largely adopted by the SHH literature, as noted  by26, which also find significantly 
depletion for the former.
A significant amount of contributions, while using the aforementioned manipulations, do not find any rela-
tionship between intuition and pro  sociality27–31. Beside these traditional manipulations, other approaches have 
been attempted including asking participants to use their intuition (induction manipulation), to rely on their 
emotions (emotion induction), or to recall times in which decisions were done more or less intuitively (recall 
induction) in their decisions. This extensive literature has been summarized in several reviews and meta-analyses. 
While overall they find evidence of a positive effect of intuition on  cooperation32–34, the observed effects have been 
shown to depend on the presence of studies including the emotion induction manipulations, without which the 
effect of intuition on cooperation  disappears35. Finally, using less standard approaches, cooperation is found to 
increase with attention to other’s payoff (identified through the eye movements in the context of an eye-tracking 
 experiment36) and with personality traits linked to self-control37.
The diverseness of results emerging from small changes in the experimental setup and the potential interac-
tions with individual heterogeneity, lead us to propose an experimental test using games to characterize individu-
als according to their types (as elicited by the games) rather than by their reaction to experimental manipulations. 
Indeed, the reason for the multiplicity of results might be that the relationship between intuition and pro sociality 
has a different sign for different people. In other terms it is possible to hypothesize that both intuitively selfish 
and intuitively pro social individuals exist. If both intuitively selfish and intuitively prosocial people exists the 
question becomes then, what could differentiate the two groups. As noted by Brañas-Garza et al38, the ability 
to overcome instinctive reactions in favour of more ponderate ones is a precondition for strategizing, but the 
latter implies also some other element of thought. Indeed, strategizing implies also internalizing expectations 
about others’  behaviour39. If this is the case, then strategizing should be taken in consideration as a mediator 
between reflectivity and pro sociality. To be clear, while both strategizing behavior and reflectivity characterize 
the cognitive ability of individuals, they point to different aspects of it. On the one side, the ability to strategize 
determines the measure in which a player is able to incorporate other players’ behaviour in their own decision-
making  processes39. On the other side, reflectivity points to the propensity of an individual to reject automatic 
response to situations in favour of more elaborate and deliberative thought. Thus, the latter prescinds from strate-
gic situations, although it constitutes one of the requirements for rational decision making in strategic situations.
In this paper, we thus run a lab-in-the field experiment where we measure pro sociality with a distribution 
game (DG)40 and impulsive versus reflective behaviors using an extended version of the popular Cognitive 
Reflection  Test2. We further control for the strategic ability of subjects using the guessing game to assess ‘whether 
and how a player’s mental process incorporates the behavior of the other players in conscious reasoning.’41. As a 
further improvement on the current methods we elicit both guessed values and declared motivation of the choice. 
The choice of the DG over strategic games alternatives (e.g. the trust game, public good game, ultimatum game) 
is dictated by the need to keep strategic considerations outside of the individual decisions about pro sociality 
so that the latter can then be related more neatly with strategic reasoning elicited through the guessing game.
To our knowledge this is the first paper that tests the interaction of these three behavioral motivations in 
an experimental setting. There is however a literature assessing the dyadic relationship between pairs of these 
three components with mixed results. Some studies analyze the connection between strategic behavior and pro 
sociality, without controlling for intuitive versus reflective behavior, and find a positive relation between strategic 
behavior and  selfishness42,43 or no significant  relationship44. In turn, without controlling for strategic reasoning, 
there are several studies that—in line with our approach—use CRT as a tool to classify participants and to assess 
the relationship between their ability to engage in cognitive reflection and pro sociality. The results of this type 
of studies are inconclusive, indeed while some find a positive relation between the CRT and pro sociality (trust 
and social efficiency)13,45,46, some that find a negative  relationship47–50.
With our experimental analysis, we find that a crucial role in the understanding of what explains pro social-
ity is played by the interaction between strategic reasoning and reflectivity. Strategic subjects are intuitively pro 
social, i.e. it takes an explicit act of self-control, measured in our experiment by the level of reflectivity, to exert 
a selfish behavior from strategic subjects. The opposite holds for non-strategic subjects, which are impulsively 
selfish. Our interpretation is that the impulsive pro sociality of strategic subjects may be linked to an ability to 
perceive intuitively the relationship between their action and the effect on others, which we surmise as sharing 
a common cognitive root with strategic reasoning. We speculate that this common root is empathy, as suggested 
 by51,52. Being a natural response to individual perception of others’ feelings, empathy possesses a natural com-
monality with strategic  reasoning53 and can help us predict pro  sociality54. Our results are robust controlling 
3
Vol.:(0123456789)
Scientific Reports |        (2021) 11:12745  | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-91960-3
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
for age - negatively related to pro sociality - and students status - which is positively related to pro sociality (as 
 in55). Our contribution qualifies the current debate in the understanding of the cognitive roots of pro social 
behavior, providing an important framing in which the impulsive pro social response could be introduced, i.e. 
strategic reasoning.
Finally, it is important to mention that the subjects in our lab-in-the-field experiment are not standard 
undergraduate students participants but are drawn from the general population recruited in three different loca-
tions in Northern Italy (see Methods section). Our decision to employ lab-in-the-field experiment stems from 
the observation that, while SHH has been studied through both online (on Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMT) 
and in-presence experiments, ISH has been studied (with the notable exception  of15) mainly with in-presence 
experiments. Furthermore, most ISH analyses involve student-only setups, while SSH involved both general 
population (on AMT) and students-only samples. This could in principle condition ISH results, as students are 
more likely, with respect to the general population, to be instructed and conditioned to think in selfish terms 
due to their exposure to at least basic form of rational economic  thinking56. Finally, a more comprehensive sam-
ple, with enhanced internal heterogeneity, best fits our analysis aimed at classifying and correlate individuals 
according to their types.
Experimental design
Our experimental setup comprises of a series of tasks presented in consecutive order to the same subjects, without 
giving a feedback on the outcome of the single parts before the end of the whole experiment. The tasks performed 
are summarized in Table 1, while the full instructions are available in Sect. S7 of Supplementary Information (SI).
The results of the PGG are discussed  in57 and in supplementary material as robustness check. The first task 
analyzed in this paper, the guessing game  (GG41), is aimed at measuring the depth of strategic reasoning. Data 
are collected on two levels, the actual choice and the declared motivation of the choice. For the actual choice, 
subjects must choose a number between 0 and 100, knowing that the winner of the game is the subject picking 
the closest number to p = 2/3 of the average of the group components’ choices. Then, after finalizing their own 
choice, subjects are asked to write down (on paper) the motivation for the choice; i.e., a strategy, a rule of thumb 
or a reasoning procedure - if any was used - thanks to which they made their choice. The first part of the assess-
ment - the actual choice game - is economically incentivized while the second is not.
The second task analyzed in this paper is a distribution game (DG) or four-players dictator game, taken 
 from40, in which each participant has to select a preferred allocation, among three different options, of the same 
amount of experimental points to anonymous components of his/her group. The participants are informed 
that the computer will select only one of each group to be the dictator and that this selection will determine the 
payoffs of everyone according to the preferences expressed by the selected subject. All the other choices will 
be payoff irrelevant after this extraction. This task is economically incentivized. Parameters values are chosen 
in order to stress the opposition between a selfish and a prosocial choice. The pro social choice (Choice C in 
Table 2) is selected according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) theory of equity (F&S in the Table)58, from Bolton and 
Ockenfels(2000) (known as ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition)59 and minimax  criteria40. 
Choice C is pro social because it maximizes both ERC and F&S criteria (see the notes of Table 2 for their formali-
zation), the payoff of the poorest (minimax) and the average income of the group. Choice A is selfish because 
it presents the highest income for the dictator and the highest variance in group payoffs. Choice B lays in the 
middle between the other two. The actual choice screens presented to subjects are shown in Fig. S11 in SI. We 
propose alternative allocations of the same income among four participants (total income is always equal to 96) 
in order to eliminate the efficiency motivation. Indeed the latter is beside the scope of the present study and—
being a salient motivation—could distort results related to pro  sociality40. The individual pro sociality has been 
measured by various games in the literature such as the  PGG6,9–13,15,18,20,27,28,36,37, the Ultimatum  Game8,13,14 and 
the  DG7,11,13,14,16,17,21,22,25,31. The choice of adopting the DG as the game to measure the pro sociality of individuals, 
stems from the observation  of13,60 that other social games such as the PGG or the Ultimatum game, involve a 
degree of strategic interactions among subjects, and decisions in those games involves expectations about others’ 
behaviour. The DG isolates the choice of the individual from other considerations, and it is particularly advisable 
given that we are measuring the subjects’ strategic abilities with the GG.
Finally, cognitive reflection is measured with an extended and improved version  of2’s Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT) based  on61. This extended version overcomes important limitations of the original. First of all, new 
items are easier to understand, overcoming the intrinsic limit of the original test concerning the reliability of 
Table 1.  Sequence of tasks in each session. PGG sessions included two variants of the Public Good Game: 
Standard and Strategy Method. The Results concerning these games are discussed  in57.
INCENTIVIZED TASKS




Comments about choice in GG (C-GG)
Survey (S)
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
TIME LINE: PGG − > GG − > C-GG − > DG − > S − > CRT 
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the results for participants with lower education levels. Second, the eight items extended scale (rather than 3) 
permits the construction of a wider scale of responses upon which to classify the observed population. Finally, 
the original test has now become very popular and the solutions are easily available in the web: the new items 
contribute to eliminate false positive answers due to informed participants who already know the results. The 
english version of the test is reported in Sect. S9 of SI.
Tasks were run with groups of four subjects, that were randomly and anonymously matched by the computer 
before each task. Before each task, each participant had also to respond to two training questions in order to 
increase tasks understanding. Taking into account also the fact that the population of participants was quite 
diverse (See Tables 9 and S29 for details), clarity was further enhanced by rendering choice screens with visual 
vignettes and examples (See Fig. S10 and S11). After the completion of each task, subjects were informed that 
they would be reassigned to a new random and anonymous group of four participants.
The experimental procedures and the structure of the sample are detailed in the Methods section.
Characterization of Strategies
The objective of this article is to evaluate pro sociality in connection with strategic reasoning and reflectivity. 
Provided that the structure of the experimental design comprises three tasks presented to the same pool of 
subjects, we classify the basic behavioral patterns of individuals according to their pro sociality, level of strategic 
reasoning and reflectivity.
Distribution game. The choices in the Distribution Game (DG), can be classified according to the level of 
pro sociality. Payoff maximizing game-theoretic agents should always pick the option that maximizes personal 
profit, i.e. choice A. However, the actual choices that our participants made during the experiment, correspond 
to the frequencies in Table 3. Our subjects are in large part pro social, consistently with the  literature62.
Guessing Game (GG and C-GG). Here we analyze data of the guessing game, i.e. the actual choice (GG) 
and the comments about the choice (C-GG) and we discuss the categorization of individual between strategic 
and naïve. In this game, for a parameter value of p ∈ [0, 1) , there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which all play-
ers choose 0. The value 0 chosen by all players is also the strategy combination that survives the procedure of infi-
nitely repeated simultaneous elimination of weakly dominated strategies. This is because a rational player is sup-
posed to eliminate weakly dominated strategies, which are values that multiply p = 2/3 by 100 or larger (i.e, in 
the interval (100p, 100]). Following this procedure, if the rational player believes the other players to be rational 
as well, he should expect nobody to choose values in the interval (100p, 100], which would lead to exclude also 
values in the interval (100p2, 100] . The limit of this reasoning process leads to the equilibrium value of 0.
Table 2.  Parameters of the distribution game (DG). Group Variance is the variance of the payoffs of each 









F&S Strict = − 1
4
∑
abs(Payoffi − Dictator Payoff ) . Minimax is the value of the minimum payoff among the 
four components of the group in each presented possible choice. Average is the simple average of the payoffs of 
the group in each choice excluding the dictator.
Player Choice A Choice B Choice C
Person 1 51 45 42
DICTATOR 30 27 24
Person 3 9 15 18
Person 4 6 9 12
Total Income 96 96 96
Criteria
Group Variance 328.5 189 126
Bolton-Ockenfels (ERC) − 6.25 − 3.13 0
F&S Strict − 22 − 16 − 12
Minimax 6 9 12
Average income of other group members 22 23 24
Table 3.  Distribution game, number and proportion of people making each choice.
Interpretation Choice # %
Self-interested Choice A 39 22%
Middle Choice B 34 19%
Pro social Choice C 103 59%
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The experimental  literature63 has found that the reasoning process that appears to describe better actual 
observed behavior is the Iterated Best Reply model with degenerate beliefs (where degenerate refers to the belief 
that the choices of all others are at one precise value), known as IBRd. The latter classifies choices according to 
the depth, or number of levels, of reasoning that each subject is supposed to implement when making his/her 
decision. Specifically, IBRd postulates that a zero level player chooses randomly in the given interval [0, 100], 
with the mean being 50. At other levels, it is assumed that every player believes that he/she is exactly one level 
of reasoning deeper than the rest of players. Therefore, a level-1 player gives best reply to the belief that every-
body else is a level-0 player and thus chooses 50p, where p = 2/3 . A level-2 player chooses 50p2 , a level-k player 
chooses 50pk and so on, up to infinite steps of reasoning where IBRd converges to the rational expectations 
equilibrium, and yields guessed value zero.
Although the IBRd model postulates that higher steps of reasoning would correspond to lower and lower 
guesses, limiting at 0 value, we take a simplified version of this model and categorize our responses according 
to only two levels : level-0 players, that we define Naïve and the remaining subjects that we call Strategic. Naïve 
subjects are those who make a guess which is equal or higher than 50 while Strategic are the remaining subjects. 
Thus, we codify as strategic only those subjects performing at least one step of reasoning. We choose this clas-
sification because the interpretation of low values of the guessing game is not univocal in the literature: a very 
low guess is not necessarily a rational guess when you expect that all the other participants are not as rational or 
strategic as you are (i.e. in absence of common knowledge of rationality). Consequently, even a highly sophis-
ticated subject could pick a number higher than 0 following his/her belief that the other players are naïve. Fol-
lowing this idea, we avoid the imposition of a rigid and predetermined structure—the steps of reasoning—to 
the data while maintaining the idea that a strategic subject must be capable at least to understand that a guess 
bigger than 50 is irrational or naïve because it is necessarily dominated by any other choice that multiplies 2/3 
by the expected average of group choice, which according to the IBRd model is 50.
A further control on the outcome of the guessing game is implemented using the information provided by 
the written comments about the choice made (C-GG) that we requested to all participants after the completion 
of the task and without economic incentive. The choice to ask for an explanation to the subjects has been imple-
mented in other designs involving games of strategic reasoning (e.g. Cerigioni et al64). The papers that reported 
the comments of all participants were tracked with their choice in the actual game. The motivation provided for 
the choice in the guessing game was codified independently by three autonomous persons. The classification, 
aimed at identifying the real motivation behind the choice in the guessing game, allowed us to codify a variable 
(GG-random) pointing out the subjects that explicitly indicated their guess as random. See Sect. S3 of SI for 
details about the procedure.
According to our classification, our sample comprises 132 strategic and 44 naïve subjects (Table 4). Accord-
ing to what stated by the participants, out of the 176, 66 choices were made by subjects who explicitly hazarded 
their guess: interestingly 51 of these are from subjects who performed a strategic choice ( Guess < 50 ), which 
suggests that using only the choice of a low value in the guessing game could lead to spurious evaluation of a 
choice as strategic. Furthermore, 17 people did not write a comment. Coherently, in the analysis that follows, 
we eliminate these observations from the database. It should be noted that, while most of our results are not 
dependent upon it (see Sect. S1 of the SI for analyses run on the full dataset), the choice of eliminating random 
guesses has the byproduct of equalizing the levels of cognitive depletion for what concerns the games played 
after the GG (whose results could be influenced by different levels of cognitive depletion). Indeed, in our setup 
being non-strategic means to have made a reasoning process that has led to a dominated or naive choice, and it 
does not mean avoiding thinking at all. Having eliminated from our sample subjects who responded by chance, 
we are left with strategic and non-strategic people, both likely to be cognitively depleted at the same level.
An alternative strategy to the one of using the self-reports to identify random guesses, would have requested 
to change the multiplication parameters as  in41,65,66 and then verify whether the guesses are proportional to the 
latter. However, using a sample from the general population requires keeping the experiment shorter, thus reduc-
ing the number of task proposed to the subject leading to our choice of using written reports.
The distribution of choices in the guessing game, which reflects standard results in the  literature41, is reported 
in Fig. 1, including also a comparison between complete and clean dataset. Most of the answers are between the 
values 22 and 33, with a focal point at the value 50.
CRT . In Fig. 2 , we show a histogram with the number of correct answers in the CRT. Most individuals answer 
correctly to between 0 and 2 questions; while only a few of them answer correctly to three or more. Here, we 
classify players as Impulsive or Reflective following two criteria based on the absolute number of correct answers 
Table 4.  Guessing game: actual choice and self-reported motivation. Actual Choice reports the choices of 
all participants in the guessing game. Self-reported motivation describes data related to the motivation of the 
choice in the guessing game, where GG-Random describes those subjects that explicitly reported to have 
hazarded a guess, divided among those making a naïve choice in the GG and those making a Strategic choice 
in the GG. Percentages are out of N=176.
N=176
Naïve Strategic
(Guess >= 50) (Guess < 50)
Actual Choice GG 44 (25%) 132 (75%)
Self-reported motivation GG-Random 15 (8.5%) 51 (29%)
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that each participant scored. For the first variable, coded CRT.DUMMY, we define as Impulsive a subject with 
zero correct answers, Middle a subject with 1 or 2 correct answers, and Reflective a subject with three or more 
correct answers. This classification emerges after observing the frequency of correct answers in the general CRT.
This variable also takes into account the fact that the CRT is a very well known test and consequently some 
subjects could know by memory the answer to at least one of the three standard CRT questions without even 
thinking about it. Also, guessing correctly one answer out of eight by chance is a possibility. However, for robust-
ness check, we use also another categorization of the CRT answers, coded as CRT01, which defines as Reflective a 
subject that responded correctly to at least one question and as Impulsive those who did not respond correctly to 
any. This second classification is the one most frequently adopted by the literature studying cognitive reflection, 
although implemented in the three questions version of the test. According to these classifications, we observed 
the frequencies reported in Table 5.
Results
The classification of stylized behavioral patterns performed above allows us to measure the combined effect of 
strategic reasoning and reflectivity on the pro social choice through an individual-level regression (subscript i 
indicates individuals). Given our research question we estimate the following equation:
Figure 1.  Top: histogram of choices in the guessing game, counts and density. Bottom: Density distribution of 
choices comparing complete database and clean (i.e., excluding random guesses).
Figure 2.  Histogram of choices in the CRT. Comparison between complete and clean database.
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In Eq. (1) prosoc is a dummy variable that takes values from 1 to 3 corresponding to the choices in the Distri-
bution Game: 1 is the ‘selfish choice’ A , 2 is the choice B, and 3 corresponds to the ‘prosocial’ choice C. strat 
is a dummy variable with value 1 for subjects providing a strategic answer in the GG (i.e., a guess smaller than 
50) and refl is a dummy variable indicating reflective subjects. Reflectivity has been measured with the two 
variables, CRT01 and CRT.DUMMY. The CRT.DUMMY takes value 1 for subjects with zero correct answers 
(Intuitive), 2 for subjects with 1 or 2 correct answers (Middle) and 3 otherwise (Reflective). The CRT.01 dummy 
takes value 1 for Reflective subjects and zero otherwise. The results for the two specifications are qualitatively 
the same, thus we focus here on the CRT.DUMMY specification (in-depth results for the CRT01 specification 
are reported in SI, Tables S11 and S12 and in Fig. S9).
The estimation was run including an interaction term that captures the non-linear relationship existing 
between choices in the GG and the DG and excluding the observations where subjects reported to have guessed 
randomly in the GG. A number of controls were included, namely: age, occupation status and gender (gathered 
from the final questionnaire), and the number of training questions that each subject responded correctly before 
the guessing game task (codified in the variable training question ).
Table 6 reports the results of OLS estimation which indicates positive significant coefficients of both the terms 
strat and refl, while the interaction term strat : refl is always significant and negative. The power analysis 
reported at the bottom of the table confirms that the model is able to detect effects which are medium in size. 
The robustness of results presented is reinforced by their stability when clustering standard errors at the session 
level (Table S11 and S15) and using Ordered Logit estimation (Tables S16 and S17–S22 for odds ratios). Further 
robustness is provided by re-classifying individuals as selfish for respondents choosing A or B in the distribution 
game and prosocial for respondents choosing C (Table S23 and S24 for OLS and Table S25 for Logit estimation). 
Finally, the regression run without dropping random guesses (Tables S1, S2 and S5) confirms the significance 
of both the interaction term and of the strat variable, albeit at a lower level due to the added noise caused by 
individuals which reported having played randomly in the GG. All these additional results are reported and 
further discussed in SI.
It is worth mentioning that in our regressions the variable age is always strongly significant: in our sample, 
young people are more prosocial, as it is evident from Models 3 in Table 6 (and Table S7). Age is particularly 
important, given its established negative relationship with cognitive abilities. In our setup, no statistically relevant 
link between this variable and strategic thinking or reflectivity has been found (Table S27) pointing to the fact 
that the relationship between and pro sociality is a direct one.
When estimating linear models, the presence of multicollinearity might partially depend on the inclusion 
of an interaction term. However, here we are interested to the interacting effect of two variables that measure 
different cognitive abilities which nonetheless could be reasonably correlated. We calculate the variance infla-
tion factor for the models considered and verify that it assumes moderate values, supporting the validity of our 
results (Table S10). To add further robustness to our choice of variables we run a stepwise regression. While 
this approach is not without his own drawbacks (as it can lead to biases in the estimation, and in particular to 
increased Type I errors associated with inflated F  values67,68) we use it for robustness and we report the results 
in Fig. S1 of the SI. The results suggest that the best model requires the use of the interaction term between CRT 
and GG results, in line with what we do in our main analysis (Eq. 1). An interaction plot analysis (reported in 
Sect. S1.1.2 of SI) confirms the importance of the interaction term. Given these reassurances, while we are aware 
of the higher variance in the estimation of the coefficient, we decide to keep our strategy.
A second important issue to stress is that the results of an estimation including interacting terms with dummy 
variables implies that the effect of one regressor on the dependent variable changes according to the different 
values assumed by the other regressor. Thus, to understand the effect of strategic reasoning and reflectivity on 
pro sociality, it is necessary to evaluate the different subsamples of people that can be classified according to the 
two classifications. The effect of strategic reasoning on pro sociality for subjects which are impulsive is different 
(1)PROSOCi = α + b1STRATi + b2REFLi + b3STRATi : REFLi + b4 CONTROLSi .
Table 5.  Classifications of subjects according to the level of reflectivity in the Cognitive Reflection Test.
CRT.dummy complete clean
Impulsive 38 16
(0 correct answers) (21%) (17%)
Middle 82 41
(1 or 2 correct answers) (47%) (44%)
Reflective 56 36
(> 2 correct answers) (32%) (38%)
CRT01 complete clean
Impulsive 38 16
(0 correct answers) (21%) (17%)
Reflective 138 77
(> 0 correct answers) (79%) (82%)
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from its effect for those that are reflective. Similarly, to understand the effect of reflectivity on pro sociality, it is 
necessary to look at the different subsamples of people classified according to the level of strategic reasoning. 
This is done in Table 7 where theoretical coefficients indicate how to classify types of participants according to 
the theoretical estimation of the equation indicated on top of the same table (Eq. 1). Once the regression has 
been estimated at the individual level to preserve the heterogeneity deriving from the values of their individual 
covariates, the estimated coefficients must be substituted in the theoretical table to obtain the average calculated 
coefficients at the group level, reported at the bottom of the table. The robustness check with the CRT.01 speci-
fication is reported in Table S12, with similar results.
We notice that the coefficients that measure the link between strategic reasoning and pro sociality in Table 7, 
are always higher than those of non strategic subjects: this result is robust to all presented specifications, which 
include two classifications for the CRT output, the inclusion of the control variables and the use of the full or 
cleaned dataset. As a further robustness check, we confirm our results reporting the estimated marginal means 
from the regressions discussed (Table 8), as well as the interaction-style plots (Fig. 4). Overall, these estimations 
allow us to state our first result:
Result 1 Strategic reasoning is positively related to pro sociality.
Figure 3 summarizes graphically the three-way relationship existing among reflectivity, strategic reasoning 
and pro sociality resulting from our estimated Model 4, while results are in Tables 7 and S12. We only discuss 
Model 2 and 4 in detail because they are the most complete and report best performance in terms of AIC, BIC 
and power value (83% and 88% respectively). We are aware of the controversial use of power significance in a 
Table 6.  Pro sociality, strategic reasoning and reflectivity. OLS. The dependent variable is the outcome in 
the Distribution game that measures pro sociality. The term strat is a dummy variable taking value one 
for subjects with a guess lower than 50 in the GG. The term CRT01 is a dummy taking value 1 for subjects 
responding correctly to at least one question in the CRT and zero otherwise. CRT.DUMMY is a dummy 
variable taking value 1 for subjects with no correct answers to the CRT, value 2 for those responding correctly 
to 1 or 1 questions, and 3 otherwise. The term gender is equal to 1 for male and training question takes value 
1 for subjects responding correctly to the training question of the GG. Significance Levels: ∗∗∗p < 0.01 , 
∗∗p < 0.05 , ∗p < 0.1.
Dep. Var. : pro sociality Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) 1.10∗ 1.43∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗ 2.34∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.48) (0.75) (0.61)
STRAT 1.67∗ 1.29∗∗ 1.64∗ 1.26∗∗













Training question 0.19 0.13
(0.30) (0.30)
AIC 230.96 230.04 213.08 211.35
BIC 243.62 242.71 232.81 231.07
Log Likelihood − 110.48 − 110.02 − 98.54 − 97.67
Deviance 58.59 58.02 49.08 48.11
Num. obs. 93 93 87 87
Power analysis
df-num 3 3 6 6
df-den 89 89 80 80
Effect size 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.20
Significance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Power 0.4 0.48 0.83 0.88
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post-analysis  comparison69, but we report it nonetheless given that all models are significant, the significance 
level has been fixed to 95% a priori and sample size is constant across models and, as discussed, this is not the 
only criterion used to make our choice.
As indicated by the arrow, the level of pro sociality is higher for reflective subjects than for intuitive subjects 
when naïve subjects are considered (Fig. 3). On the contrary, when strategic subjects are considered, the arrow 
points downward: more reflective subjects are on average less prosocial. This evidence, qualitatively robust to 
all the aforementioned specifications, suggests our second result:
Table 7.  Theoretical and estimated coefficients: Model 2, Model 4. Theoretical coefficients indicate how 
to calculate the coefficients related to each type of subject according to the two classifications (Strategic-
reflective), using the estimated coefficients from Equation (1) and reported in Table 6. To obtain the exact 
values of the coefficients of the table, both calculated and theoretical, it is necessary to substitute the values 
of strat (0,1) and crt.dummy (0,1,2) in the equation at the top of the table, to obtain the resulting composed 
coefficients presented later in the Table, and using the estimated values of the regression of Table 6.
Theoretical coefficients
Equation:
PROSOC(DG) = α + b1 STRAT + b2 CRT .DUMMY + b3 STRAT : CRT .DUMMY
naïve (strat=0) strategic (strat=1)
intuitive (crt.dummy=0) α α + b1
middle (crt.dummy=1) α + b2 α + b1 + b2 + b3
reflective (crt.dummy=2) α + 2b2 α + b1 + 2b2 + 2b3
Calculated coefficients
Model 2 Model 4
naïve strategic naïve strategic
intuitive 1.43 2.72 2.34 3.60
middle 1.92 2.57 2.81 3.39
reflective 2.40 2.42 3.29 3.17
Table 8.  Estimated marginal means for DG.
naïve strategic
(strat=0) (strat=1)
intuitive (crt.dummy=0) 1.86 2.56
middle(crt.dummy=1) 2.5 2.42
reflective (crt.dummy=2) 2.8 2.26
Figure 3.  Calculated Coefficients of Model 4 (Table 7).
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Result 2 Reflectivity relates to higher pro sociality among naïve subjects and to lower pro sociality among 
strategic subjects.
Our results together suggest that while being strategic per sé leads to a higher tendency to be prosocial, 
reflectivity has a different impact on pro sociality, depending on whether subjects are capable of strategic sophis-
tication or not.
We note the fact that our results emerge more neatly when we consider the dataset excluding answers from 
subjects that explicitly admitted to have hazarded a guess in that task. This suggests that the information pro-
vided by the written comments of the participants qualify their choices in the Guessing game. Written accounts 
constitute a significant improvement in the understanding of the role of the guessing game as a measure of 
strategic reasoning because they allow to remove spurious choices coming from subjects who admitted having 
responded at random and at the same time providing a guess belonging to the range of strategic guesses. It can 
also explain the lack of a significant relationship between strategic reasoning and pro sociality found in previous 
contributions studying the relationship between strategic reasoning and pro  sociality44. While written accounts 
are not incentivized and may also be in principle prone to false answers, there are no incentives for a participant 
to falsely declare to have guessed an answer. As a robustness check we also run our complete set of analyses 
on the full dataset (where random guesses are not dropped) qualitatively confirming both results. Results are 
reported in Sect. S1 of SI.
One potential alternative explanation for our results is that subjects engaging in higher levels of reason-
ing in the Guessing game might be more cognitively depleted, which in turn, could have led to more intuitive 
responses in the CRT (played at the end of the experiment). While this alternative cannot be fully discounted 
with our experimental setup, we consider it as less likely for several reasons. First, we find no evidence in the 
 literature32–35,70 that high reasoning in the GG causes significant depletion in the successive games, while Pey-
sakhovich  &  Rand13—similarly to us—use a CRT played after a long battery of strategic and not strategic games, 
to classify individuals according to their reflectivity. Second, the one-shot guessing game is a relatively fast task 
Figure 4.  Interaction-style plot for estimated marginal means.
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that is unlikely to cause significant depletion. Finally, the elimination of random guesses mitigates the risk of 
uneven levels of cognitive depletion among subjects. A complete disambiguation between these alternative 
explanations deserves further investigation, possibly with complementary experimental strategies, including 
treatments that shuffle game order.
Discussion
Whether humans are naturally good to one another or are rather evolved to fight one against the other for sur-
vival, is a fascinating question. Indeed, social evolution, culture and education taught humans to control their 
natural dispositions. But which are the natural dispositions and which are the learned behaviors is subject to a 
lively debate.
In our paper, we explore this issue experimentally and find two interesting results. Our first result states that 
being pro social is positively related to strategizing. This result suggests that the propensity to make decisions 
that favor others at a cost to oneself and considering others’ potential behaviors when taking a decision, seem to 
belong to a common cognitive root which allows a person to understand the relationship between his decisions, 
the decisions of the others, and the outcome that follows from that, and at the same time to perceive that his 
own behavior can affect others.
We can venture an explanation to our results through empathy, which is the natural response to individual 
perception of others’  feelings51. Empathy is a process that is activated in some humans even in absence of any 
direct emotional stimulation: thus promoting other-regarding behavior as an automatic  process51. Singer, T. 
& Fehr, E.51suggest that there exists a connection between higher empathic abilities and better faculty to pre-
dict other’s motives and actions, i.e. strategic thinking. Moreover, given that empathy is heterogeneous across 
 individuals71,72, people with stronger empathic abilities can be identified as those predicting better others’ motives 
and actions. Our result could then be explained as an empathic automatic response against unfair allocations of 
income, internalized by subjects with cognitive abilities sharing common roots with cognitive processes charac-
terizing strategic  reasoning53. In support of this speculation, recently Schurz et al.53 mapped tasks belonging to 
strategic reasoning (or Theory of Mind, ToM) and empathy to the set of underlying processes linked to concrete 
experimental tasks, in search of the common neurocognitive components that they involve. This exercise, support 
the idea that empathy and ToM share specific processes and therefore brain activities. On this regard, it is important 
to stress that empathy is considered as an umbrella term involving both affective and cognitive empathy. Affective 
empathy involves the sharing of others’ feelings, emotions or—in general—the sensory states of another person 
related to the activation of limbic regions which are often elicited through visualization of strong emotions (in 
particular pain). This process is thought to generate isomorphic affective states by direct  signaling73. Contrast-
ingly, cognitive empathy involves the cognitive inference on another person’s affective state. This is a process of 
perspective taking over others’ states, which does not require the direct experience of emotions, but nonetheless 
involves both perspectives taking on others and the identification of others’ feelings, often through simulation of 
own  states73. Cognitive empathy is associated with both processes and brain regions associated with mentalizing 
as well as with those involved in affective processing (i.e. it shows similarities to the processes involved in the 
direct experience of emotions). Thus, the cognitive component of empathy is the one that can be linked to pro 
sociality, in line  with74, which found that similar brain regions that are involved in both the mentalizing network 
and the empathy network are also linked to pro sociality.
Our second result indicates that the group of subjects capable to understand that their actions may affect 
the others (strategic subjects) are, on average, intuitively prosocial. For these individuals, being selfish requires 
deliberation, so that being more reflective acts as an anti-social device, consistently with the intuitive pro sociality 
 view75. While this attitude characterizes strategic subjects, they do not always exercise it: in line  with14, strategic 
subjects are on average innately pro social but can exert selfish behavior with reflectivity. Accordingly, we observe 
a difference between the natural-intuitive response and the reflected choice, consistently with the principle of a 
dual process of  reasoning76. In turn, the group of non-strategic subjects is intuitively more selfish. They can be 
prosocial but they need to make an effort, they need to reflect on it: their nature does not lead them to perceive 
instinctively that their actions may influence others, so they naturally exercise their selfish attitude when acting 
impulsively. While a tight empirical test for this explanation is beyond the reach of the experimental design 
described in this manuscript, this hypothesis deserves being studied in further research.
Naturally, our work has limitations. From the theoretical viewpoint what presented here is only a first step 
to attempt a disentanglement of the composite effects of strategic reasoning and reflectivity on pro sociality. 
Indeed, these cognitive elements have both commonalities and differences which need further dedicated designs 
to be fully disentangled. Furthermore, the DG is only one of the possible measures of pro sociality, and differ-
ent measures could possibly lead to different results. Additionally, further investigation with complementary 
experimental strategies, shuffling the order of tasks, is needed to completely rule out the possibly of heterogenous 
levels of depletion. Finally, it is important to stress that our results are obtained with a sample of the general 
population in a region of Northern Italy, instead of a standard undergraduate students sample. Beside limiting 
the achievable sample size, it should be noted that according to the Social Heuristics Hypothesis, the intuitive 
mode of pro sociality is the result of experience, culture and education, implying that results could be different 
in other regions in Italy and even more in other countries. Future research will involve an investigation of these 
possible heterogeneities.
Methods
Procedures. The experiment was conducted using the Reggio Emilia Behavioral and Experimental mobile 
Laboratory (REBEL) of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, using last generation tablets. Experimen-
tal sessions were run in the Italian provinces of Modena (in the municipalities of Vignola and Mirandola) and 
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Reggio Emilia (in the main town of the province) between November 2015 and May 2016. In Vignola and 
Mirandola the experimental sessions were organized in the municipalities’ council chambers while in Reggio 
Emilia, the experimental sessions were organized in a large meeting room at the university. All venues used for 
the experiment were near or at well-known locations. They were all accessible by car and public transport. Socio-
demographic informations about the municipalities of the three locations are reported in Table S28.
For each of the three locations, individuals were recruited from the general population through a procedure 
aimed at maximizing the diversity in the sample. First, 100 letters were sent to a group of families randomly 
extracted from the population of the municipalities involved. Then, flyers and posters advertising the event 
were affixed in a large number of public places (such as bars, restaurants and shops). The events were advertised 
through the municipalities newsletters and through a Facebook page. Finally a large ( ∼ 4000 ) number of ex-
students (graduated from 2009 to 2015) from all faculties of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia were 
contacted through email, inviting them to spread the information about the experiment. Interested individuals 
were invited to contact the researchers by email, through a web-form on a publicly available webpage, or by 
phone, and were then randomly assigned to an experimental session organized in their municipality of residence 
or nearby.
The selection of the participants from the pool of candidates was made imposing four restrictions. First, 
subjects had to be 18 years or older. Second, they had to be current residents in the municipality where the 
experimental sessions were run, or in the neighboring municipalities. Third, subject were asked to declare that 
they had no open criminal charges. Finally, running the experiment in towns where no experimental lab exists, we 
are confident that the vast majority of the participants never previously participated in behavioural experiments. 
The fact of having individuals naïve to the experimental settings puts us in line with results from both  ISH15 and 
 SHH6 which find relationship between pro sociality and intuition for this type of participants.
The whole experiment was developed in Python on the o-Tree web-based  platform77. This software platform 
has been developed for running experiments on touchscreen based mobile/tablet workstations with easy of use 
visual interfaces. This facilitates the understanding of the software across a population not necessarily possessing 
computer proficiency. The easiness of use of both o-Tree and tablets was assessed by the participants in a very 
positive way (see Table S29 of SI).
Upon arrival at the experimental session, subjects were registered and assigned a seat. Participants were 
given both an informed consent as well as a privacy consent and data release form to read and sign. Participants 
were informed they could leave at any moment, but nobody did. During the experimental sessions visual con-
tact among participants was made impossible by the use of mobile cubicles, furthermore all participants were 
informed of the fact that oral communication was forbidden.
During the whole experiment the relevant instructions appearing on the tablets were read aloud by one 
experimenter (always the same for all sessions). The relevant instructions were available at the bottom of the 
screen at any time during the task and freely accessible by the participants.
The experiment was conducted in accordance with regulations and relevant guidelines for experiments with 
human subjects of the REBEL (Reggio Emilia Behavioural Economics Laboratory) at the University of Modena 
and Reggio Emilia and therefore approved by the REBEL’s ethics committee.
Average session time was one hour, and payoffs were expressed in experimental points (tokens), with each 
token corresponding to 0.04 €. The average payment per person was around 15 €. The composition of our final 
sample is outlined in Table 9 and detailed in Table S29. Our recruitment strategy allowed us to gather a sample 
of individuals significantly different from a student-only one. Indeed, while our sample overweights students, 
young individuals and females, the whole spectrum of the local population is represented in the sample both in 
terms of age, sex, and working status.
The number of participants was 16 for each experimental session, with every individual allowed to participate 
in only one session. All sessions were run on Saturdays in order to favor a wider and more diverse participation.
Received: 23 January 2020; Accepted: 1 June 2021
Table 9.  Socio-demographic data of the experimental sample. Percentages are out of the total number of 
participants, N=176. *Not Active refers to: housewives, retired, unemployed and unoccupied individuals.
Participants: N =176
Age classes: Gender Work status:
18-25 73 (41,5%) Male: 61 (34%) Employed 82 (46,6%)
26-35 36 (20,4%) Female: 112 (64%) Not Active* 25 (14,2%)
36-45 17 (9,7%) NA 3 (2%) Student 67 (38,1%)
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